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Home / Opinions

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OIC Economies

Rethinking the tourism legacy of mega sporting events

07 Sep 2026
Opinion

Halal Industry
Sponsored
What the IFANCA-UNICEF partnership reveals about high-impact giving
15 May 2026
Opinion

Halal Industry
How creating an empowered institution will bolster Indonesia’s Islamic economy
12 May 2026
Opinion

All
Imbibing responsibility across the marketplace
21 Apr 2026
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17 Feb 2026
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All Other Opinions
OIC Economies
Rethinking the tourism legacy of mega sporting events

The global fervor around mega sporting events is electrifying but governments need to revisit their tourism playbooks to build a strong case for hefty infrastructure investments 

As I walked through downtown Houston on my way to the FIFA Fan Festival, it was heartwarming to see scores of fans dressed in their team colors, filling the streets, spilling out of hotels and crowded restaurants.

For several weeks, the World Cup put Houston - the most populous city in the US state of Texas - at the forefront of global attention, a destination that may have otherwise escaped many international travelers' notice. 

Houston’s experience provides a useful starting point for a broader discourse for OIC countries preparing to host major sporting events: how can a few weeks of global attention translate into sustainable tourism demand?

Image courtesy: Official X account of FIFA World Cup 26 Houston

The Texan city hosted seven matches at Houston Stadium while holding a free fan festival in East Downtown. The city did not build a new stadium - Houston Stadium has held the Houston Texans, a professional American football team, the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, concerts and other major events. 

The city’s financial exposure, therefore, was distinct from OIC destinations that were compelled to construct new stadiums, tourism districts and transport systems for global events. 

The tournament brought Houston footfall, revenue, international exposure and visible energy – in essence, a high return on its initial investment.

As many as 480,186 fans attended the seven matches, of whom 81% came from outside the Houston area while 44% were international visitors. The Houston Host Committee recorded another 551,313 attendances at the fan festival and the Houston Dynamo Soccer Celebration. 

The hotel sector visibly benefited with average daily rates rising nearly 21% during Houston’s three weeks of matches, lifting revenue per available room by 19% and total hotel revenue by 20%. Downtown hotels performed even more strongly, with total revenue up 46%. 

On balance, the city’s World Cup campaign centered on its residents, restaurants, events and multicultural character, according to a Houston First Corporation spokesperson. 

“Authenticity is key to relatability and what’s going to move a would-be traveler to action. That’s why we are continuing to use this campaign even after the tournament has concluded; it’s true to our identity as a welcoming, international city.” 

However, the investment and feasibility parameters for OIC nations are different and continues to weigh long after the final goal is scored. Therefore, the infrastructure investment required to host global events has to support ongoing tourism demand and generate economic value that outlives any sporting event. 

Qatar’s FIFA World Cup legacy 
Qatar offers a recent case for OIC countries keen to make infrastructure investments.

The International Monetary Fund estimated that Qatar undertook a decade-long infrastructure program of $200–300 billion ahead of the 2022 World Cup. The eight stadiums reportedly cost about $6.5 billion. The wider program included hotels, the metro and rail system, roads, utilities, port and airport development, and other projects linked to Qatar’s national development plans.

Qatar has continued to create demand around that investment. The FIFA Arab Cup in December 2025 used six World Cup stadiums and attracted 1,220,063 spectators, a quarter of them being foreigners. The country is also hosting the FIFA U-17 World Cup annually from 2025 through 2029, drawing on the stadium, accommodation and transport capacity developed for the 2022 event.

Image courtesy: Shutterstock 

Qatar also carried the Hayya platform beyond the event. Introduced for World Cup entry and identification, it now serves as the country’s central platform for tourist and event visas. Qatar welcomed 5.1 million international visitors in 2025, growing 3.7% on the previous year, while room nights sold rose 8.6%.

Attributing this growth to the World Cup alone would overstate the evidence. What can be observed is a sustainable long-term strategy of repurposing and utilizing assets built for the 2022 FIFA Cup. 

While drafting the State of the Global Islamic Economy 2025/26 report, one of the signals identified was that OIC destinations were moving towards multi-year event pipelines instead of competing for one tournament at a time.

Qatar illustrates the logic. A sequence of sporting, cultural and business events can keep a destination visible and spread demand across venues, hotels and transport networks long after the original event. However, maintaining an event pipeline is only part of the equation.

The events must also be connected to a broader strategy that encourages visitors to stay longer, explore more and ultimately return.

Dr. Kamilla Swart-Arries, an associate professor at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, said that Qatar’s next phase must extend beyond attracting additional events. 

“Qatar needs to move from an event-hosting model to an integrated destination-development model. Major events can generate international visibility and concentrated visitor demand, but sustained tourism depends on what happens before, during and after the event.”

Incoming: Morocco, Saudi Arabia 
Morocco will co-host the 2030 FIFA World Cup with Spain and Portugal. It is investing approximately $20 billion in rail, roads, airports, stadiums and other urban infrastructure.

The country also plans to add 60,000 hotel beds by 2030, about one-fifth of its current capacity, while working towards the 26-million-annual-visitors goal. Morocco welcomed 19.8 million tourists in 2025.

For Morocco, return on investments will come down to what happens after 2030: whether the additional accommodation, transport capacity and stadiums continue to attract enough demand after the tournament. 

While Morocco has an edge with its established cultural destinations and strong tourism demand, the World Cup could help spread interest beyond the usual hubs, connect football with food, heritage, coastal and mountain experiences, and direct more spending to small hotels, guides and local businesses.

A post-2030 domestic and global tourism calendar must become a priority once the tournament frenzy recedes.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia will host the 2034 FIFA World Cup, the first 48-team tournament held in a single country. Its official bid includes 15 stadiums in five locations: Riyadh, Jeddah, Al Khobar, Abha and NEOM. 

Image courtesy: Official X account of Saudi Arabia FIFA World Cup 2034 

Four existing stadiums are scheduled for refurbishment, three were under construction when the bid was submitted and eight are new builds. Several sit within wider tourism, entertainment and urban developments, including Qiddiya City, Jeddah Central and NEOM.

Saudi Arabia has given thought to post-tournament use at the planning stage. The bid identifies an operator and a primary legacy use for each stadium. Several venues are intended to become home grounds for professional clubs; others combine sporting, entertainment, exhibition, university or community uses.

The upper tier at the Qiddiya Coast Stadium will be redacted after the World Cup, reducing capacity to around 25,000, while a removable pitch and internal partitions would allow the venue to host e-sports, exhibitions, concerts, conferences and other sports.

The Prince Mohammed bin Salman Stadium is also planned with a retractable roof and pitch so it can operate both as an outdoor stadium and an indoor arena.

The revised approach to Saudi Arabia’s winter-sports program offers another useful example. After Almaty was selected to host the 2029 Asian Winter Games, the Saudi Olympic and Paralympic Committee and the Olympic Council of Asia agreed that the kingdom would first host a series of standalone winter-sports events.

The competitions are intended to broaden participation and develop athletes, technical officials and operational experience before future Asian Winter Games. The revised sequence uses smaller events to build the market and capability in stages.

Setting out legacy uses at the bid stage gives Saudi Arabia the opportunity to let post-tournament needs shape venue capacity, design and operating budgets. The next step is to support those plans with firm commitments from operators, tenants and event organizers before key construction decisions are finalized.

Swart-Arries believes Saudi Arabia and Morocco should begin with the post-event visitor journey.

“They should ask not only, ‘How will people attend the World Cup?’ but also, ‘Why will they return five years later, where will they travel, how long will they stay, and who within the local economy will benefit?’”

Lessons from Brazil and London
Brazil and London illustrate how much of a venue’s future is decided before the opening day.

Brazil built or renovated 12 stadiums for the 2014 World Cup, including four in cities with lower-level football clubs and limited recurring demand. The stadium program finished 50% over budget, and only six of the 35 promised public-transport projects were completed on time. 

London approached the 2012 Olympic Games with a legacy organization, plans for the future design and operation of the park, and long-term operators for most venues in place before the Games.

The Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park now combines sporting venues with housing, cultural institutions, public space and community use. The model has not covered all public costs, but post-event governance and reuse were part of the plan from the outset.

Image courtesy: Shutterstock

Barcelona’s 1992 Olympics show what a strong tourism legacy can achieve. The city used the Games to accelerate improvements to its waterfront, public spaces, transport and tourism infrastructure.

Meanwhile, hotel tourists increased from 1.87 million in 1992 to 3.14 million in 2000, while overnight stays rose from 4.33 million to 7.78 million, according to research published by the Centre d’Estudis Olímpics at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. 

 The city also established Turisme de Barcelona in 1993 to continue marketing the destination after the Games.

What comes after
Planning also needs to connect different investments being made for the event.

Stadiums, hotels, airports and rail lines may be developed through separate workstreams, but they will rely on the same pool of visitors.

Hosts could bring these plans together in a five- to ten-year post-event demand plan showcasing future events being pursued, expected visitor traffic, cities and assets they will use, and organizations responsible for delivering them. 

Bringing this information together would help reveal gaps, periods of excess capacity and cases where different projects are relying on the same projected demand.

Not all legacy infrastructure is physical. Qatar’s continued use of Hayya shows how a platform created for one tournament can continue supporting the visitor journey after the event.

More so, these platforms can help travellers discover future events, plan new itineraries and return. Host countries invest heavily in attracting and processing an international audience but often lose that connection once the event ends.

Mega sporting events propel a destination into the spotlight - a level of international exposure that would be costly or difficult to achieve through tourism marketing alone. For OIC nations to convert hefty investments into sustained tourism growth, key long-term strategies must shape planning from the outset.
 

07 Sep 2026
Opinion
Halal Industry
What the IFANCA-UNICEF partnership reveals about high-impact giving

The wild poliovirus remains endemic in just two countries: Afghanistan and Pakistan. Eradication is within sight, but the last mile is the most difficult.

UNICEF USA's Michael J. Nyenhuis and IFANCA's Dr. Muhammed Munir Chaudry discuss how philanthropy can help finish the fight to eradicate polio.

Polio eradication is within reach: vaccinating every child requires trust, access and sustained investment

As President and CEO of UNICEF USA, I’ve had the privilege of witnessing what is possible when committed partners come together around the shared mission of safeguarding the future for children everywhere. Today, we are closer than ever to eradicating polio — a once-devastating disease that has been reduced by more than 99 percent globally.

Yet the final mile remains the hardest. Polio persists in just two countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, areas where reaching every child requires not just vaccines, but trust, access and sustained investment. This is precisely why partnerships like the one between IFANCA (Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America) and UNICEF are so critical at this moment.

IFANCA’s recently renewed commitment comes at a pivotal time; not only in the fight against polio, but in the ongoing work to strengthen the broader systems that protect children from similar preventable diseases. From nutrition to immunization, as well as global coordination and community-level engagement, this collaboration reflects what it takes to drive lasting and systemic impact.

In a recent conversation, I discussed the intersection of nutrition, immunization and health equity with IFANCA’s President and CEO, Dr. Muhammed Munir Chaudry, who shared insights on the role of cultural integrity and partnership in advancing a healthier, more resilient future for every child.

MICHAEL J. NYENHUIS: IFANCA has announced a significant multi-year commitment to support UNICEF’s polio eradication efforts, building on its earlier investment. What motivated IFANCA to deepen this partnership, and why is this moment so critical in the fight against preventable diseases like polio?

DR. MUHAMMED MUNIR CHAUDRY: IFANCA’s decision to extend our partnership with UNICEF reflects a longstanding commitment to advancing health equity and protecting vulnerable populations. Health equity begins by ensuring that every individual has the opportunity to prevent and overcome preventable diseases like polio. This effort is closely tied to broader health and development outcomes, which remain central to IFANCA’s mission. At this critical stage, when polio is close to eradication but still persists in regions of the world, renewed financial commitments are essential to finish the job and safeguard future generations.

MICHAEL J. NYENHUIS: At UNICEF, we see every day that nutrition is foundational to children’s development, well-being, and survival. From IFANCA’s perspective, how does access to safe, nutritious and culturally appropriate food serve as a cornerstone of health equity — both globally and in the United States?

DR. MUHAMMED MUNIR CHAUDRY: IFANCA understands food security as an essential component of human development and well-being. A lack of access to proper nutrition can have a lifelong adverse impact on children, leading to underdevelopment and diminished potential for the rest of their life. From our perspective, access to safe, nutritious and culturally appropriate food is foundational to health equity, as it directly shapes physical growth, cognitive development and long-term wellbeing. This is true both globally and within the United States — disparity in the availability of proper food exists globally, irrespective of a country being rich or poor. Ensuring access to nutritious food aligns with IFANCA’s core values and remains critical to building healthier, more resilient communities for current and future generations.

MICHAEL J. NYENHUIS: We know that nutrition and immunization are not separate interventions — they reinforce one another. Can you speak to the science behind how malnutrition affects vaccine effectiveness?

DR. MUHAMMED MUNIR CHAUDRY: Science clearly demonstrates that nutrition and immunization are deeply interconnected and must be considered together. Malnutrition, particularly deficiencies in important nutrients such as protein, essential vitamins and minerals, compromises immune function and limits the body’s ability to mount a strong response to vaccines. In undernourished individuals, the immune system may not generate sufficient or lasting protection, thereby reducing vaccine efficacy.

This is why nutrition is not a secondary consideration, but a foundational component of successful immunization programs, ensuring that vaccines can deliver their full protective benefit to target populations. Healthy bodies have the strength to fight disease, but poor nutrition inhibits proper function of immunity in nutritionally compromised individuals.

MICHAEL J. NYENHUIS: UNICEF operates in some of the world’s most challenging contexts — from Gaza to Afghanistan to Pakistan — where nutrition and immunization must be delivered together. Drawing on your experience, including living in Pakistan, what lessons from these efforts are most relevant to strengthening nutrition access and public health systems locally?

DR. MUHAMMED MUNIR CHAUDRY: Growing up in rural Pakistan, I observed many adults affected by the smallpox virus. Their faces were full of small dimples. We were vaccinated at the age of 8 to 10 years with a needle prick in a circular motion at several places on the upper arm, which left a roundish torn mark on the skin that scarred upon healing. I still have several of those marks on my left arm.

In my experience, particularly having been vaccinated myself in Pakistan and observing similar contexts, one key lesson is that nutrition and immunization cannot be approached in isolation. Communities respond best when services are integrated, trusted and locally grounded. Building partnerships with local health workers, religious leaders and community organizations is essential to overcoming misinformation and improving uptake. Additionally, consistency in delivery and ensuring vaccines and nutrition support reach even the most remote areas strengthens public confidence. Ultimately, sustainable progress depends on aligning public health efforts with cultural values, transparency and a shared commitment to human dignity.

Dr. Muhammed Munir Chaudry with Michael J. Nyenhuis
Dr. Muhammed Munir Chaudry (left) with Michael J. Nyenhuis (right).

MICHAEL J. NYENHUIS: Trust is essential in both nutrition and immunization efforts. Why are food integrity and cultural appropriateness so important when working with diverse communities?

DR. MUHAMMED MUNIR CHAUDRY: How do we define trust? Trust is something humanistic. We trust others to do the right thing. Trust is foundational to both nutrition and immunization efforts because communities must have confidence in what they are receiving and who is delivering it. Public health initiatives often falter not due to science, but because of mistrust, fear or misunderstanding. Ensuring food integrity and cultural appropriateness such as halal compliance signals that interventions align with local values and beliefs. When communities see that their ethical and religious standards are respected, they are far more likely to engage, accept services and obtain positive long-term health outcomes.

MICHAEL J. NYENHUIS: From your perspective, how does the partnership between IFANCA and UNICEF demonstrate what’s possible when organizations align around shared values like science, integrity and a commitment to children’s well-being?

DR. MUHAMMED MUNIR CHAUDRY: From my perspective, the partnership between IFANCA and UNICEF demonstrates the power of complementary strengths aligned around shared values. IFANCA brings expertise in food integrity, ethical compliance and community trust, while UNICEF brings global scale, technical capacity and on-the-ground delivery in some of the most challenging environments. There are areas each organization cannot address alone, but together, we create a more robust and credible infrastructure to support children’s well-being. This collaboration reflects how science, integrity and shared moral responsibility can translate into meaningful, sustainable impact for vulnerable populations.

MICHAEL J. NYENHUIS: Looking ahead, what gives you optimism about our ability to protect children from preventable diseases — and what would you say to organizations or individuals considering how they can contribute?

DR. MUHAMMED MUNIR CHAUDRY: What gives me optimism is that we are closer than ever to protecting children from preventable disease, and we are seeing unprecedented alignment between science, institutions and communities. Partnerships between organizations like IFANCA and UNICEF demonstrate that when expertise, trust and shared purpose come together, meaningful progress follows.

Equally important are the individuals working within these organizations and in the field whose daily efforts, integrity and commitment translate vision into action. To those considering contributing, I would say: every role matters. Consistent, values-driven work and individual contribution — no matter how small — creates the collective change needed to safeguard future generations.

Michael J. Nyenhuis is the President and CEO of UNICEF USA.

Disclaimer: This article first appeared in Forbes and UNICEF USA.

15 May 2026
Opinion
Halal Industry
How creating an empowered institution will bolster Indonesia’s Islamic economy

Indonesia’s ambition to deepen its presence and lead the global Islamic economy has long been established on strategy documents, national roadmaps, and high-level vision statements. Execution, however, remains the real test. 

The planned transformation of the National Committee for Sharia Economy and Finance, more commonly known as KNEKS, into Badan Ekonomi Syariah or Shariah Economy Agency is now visible on the horizon, with a draft under inter-ministerial discussion and expectations of being signed in the near term.

This shift is not new. Analysts and stakeholders have long advocated that Indonesia’s nascent Shariah governance architecture should evolve beyond a coordinating committee to an empowered institutional body with stronger legal standing. But as final legal instruments progress toward issuance, the practical implications of this transition and its stakes deserve careful examination.

KNEKS was established under Presidential Regulation No. 28 of 2020, expanding its predecessor’s mandate from a finance-only focus to encompass broader economic and financial dimensions of halal ecosystems.

Over the last several years, it has played a critical role in aligning cross-sector priorities, from halal industry development to Sharia finance expansion and MSME ecosystem support, helping build a more cohesive narrative around Indonesia’s economic Islam agenda.

Yet today’s committee remains largely coordination-oriented, with limited authority to enforce policy decisions or manage execution in a sustained and autonomous way.

This institutional limitation reflects a broader challenge in Indonesia’s governance: committees can align intentions and foster dialogue, but they are structurally constrained when it comes to execution authority, budget autonomy, and strategic oversight. 

KNEKS has often had to rely on persuasion rather than authority to bridge inter-ministerial and institutional differences, slowing down implementation and weakening accountability for outcomes.

That is why the planned upgrade to a Badan Ekonomi Syariah is significant, if it is designed to empower action rather than merely rebrand the institution. The legal elevation could strengthen four strategic capacities that matter most for converting policy into impact:

-    Decision authority: A badan model is expected to provide a clearer and more authoritative mechanism for resolving inter-ministerial trade-offs in policy design and execution, something that committees traditionally struggle to do. This is especially crucial for a multi-sectoral agenda such as the Islamic economy, which inherently intersects finance, trade, industry, certification, and social finance domains.
-    Budget control: KNEKS’ coordination has historically depended on ministries’ internal budgets and priorities. An empowered Badan Ekonomi Syariah, by contrast, could manage dedicated funds or influence budget planning more effectively, enabling sustained programs across data infrastructure, market access initiatives, capacity building, and MSME support.
-    Staffing and professional capacity: Building a competitive Islamic economy requires more than technical recommendations; it requires operational talent, program managers, policy specialists, and execution units. Transitioning to a badan structure could support the retention of in-house expertise rather than episodic secondments and fragmented resourcing.
-    Policy influence: A more authoritative institution can ensure policy coherence across ministries and regulators, reducing fragmented incentives and regulatory disjoints that often weaken implementation chains.

Reports suggest that the new body will have evaluation powers nearly equivalent to a coordinating ministry, even while execution remains with technical ministries.

Timing matters. Indonesia is already ranked among the top three global markets in the Islamic economy, yet its governance approach has not evolved at the same pace as its ecosystem maturity. Institutional reforms like this signal to investors, industry players, and global partners that Indonesia is serious about not just crafting strategy but also operationalizing it in ways that deliver measurable outcomes.

The implications of this shift will be felt across the entire ecosystem once the structure is formalized.

For the government and regulators, a stronger institutional backbone should reduce fragmentation and provide clearer lines of accountability. An empowered body could bridge gaps where policy intentions historically dissipated into stovepipes, enabling more agile responses to emerging opportunities and crises alike.

For the industry and investors, clarity of governance translates into confidence. An empowered Badan Ekonomi Syariah has the potential to act as a single-entry point for national priorities, helping streamline public-private partnerships, align incentives, and present a more predictable landscape for capital deployment.

For MSMEs and halal entrepreneurs, the upgrade holds the promise of more integrated support, from financing access to certification pathways and market linkages, reducing the administrative friction that many small business owners continue to face.

However, institutional upgrades always carry risks, especially in transition periods. If a badan is formalized with overlapping mandates or unclear jurisdiction, it could inadvertently become another bureaucratic layer rather than a force multiplier, precisely the outcome critics caution against. Without careful design, there is also a risk that bureaucracy grows heavier and less agile, undermining the very agility the reform seeks to achieve.

Finally, this transition matters not just for the Sharia economy, but also for Indonesia’s broader political and economic narrative. The Badan Ekonomi Syariah could become a defining institutional legacy of the Prabowo administration, signaling a shift toward governance models that prioritize execution power, cross-sector coherence, and structural modernization.

In an era where economic growth models worldwide are being rethought, shelving fragmented planning for empowered implementation.

Indonesia does not need another institution for the sake of having one. It needs an institution capable of turning ambition into compounding, measurable progress. The elevation of KNEKS into a Badan Ekonomi Syariah, if executed thoughtfully, could mark that turning point. 

What remains critical now is how this opportunity is shaped, resourced, and brought to life beyond the ceremonial signing of a regulation.

Rianovel Mare is a consultant and project manager at DinarStandard

Also read: Can Indonesia’s new wealth fund lift or sink its economy?

                   Indonesia's tech soul is on the line

12 May 2026
Opinion
All
Imbibing responsibility across the marketplace

In our previous article, we established the need to approach business (and work in general) from an inherently moral perspective.

Rather than zeroing in on the bottom line, we need to take a step back and assess how each line of the P&L affects everyone - from people to the planet and everything in between.

In short, business is not a neutral activity. As Muslims, each and every one of us is mukallaf, or legally and morally responsible to deliver benefits, avoid harm, and uphold the welfare of all stakeholders in our business activities.  

As Muslims, we have the benefit of looking up to the example of our Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) for guidance and inspiration.

According to a hadith narrated by the second caliph Umar ibn Al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him), the Prophet (PBUH) said that whoever, whether they be the seller or the buyer, before entering the market, recited a prayer declaring Allah's oneness and greatness, “God will record for him a million good deeds, obliterate from him a million evil deeds, raise him a million degrees, and build him a house in paradise.” 

The recitation of this prayer is set to induce a particular state of consciousness when people enter a marketplace. It’s meant to put people in a ‘zone’. The reward promised is for whoever recites this prayer, with no additional conditions mentioned. In the Prophet’s Madinah, over 1,400 years ago, when the whole community was built around the concept of helping each other, entering and staying in the ‘zone’ was simple as there was already a natural environment that enjoined good and forbade evil in commerce and in all aspects of life. 

The “market” today
Things have changed over the past 1,400 years, and markets don't conform to physical boundaries. Consequently, the limits of the zone, too, need to be shelved or expanded in accordance with the market which surrounds us today.

Smartphones have, unwittingly and perhaps unwillingly, become the major conduit for most, if not all, our dealings and purchases. We are no longer zoned in consciously or by design. We function in a constant state.

This all-encompassing condition exponentially compounds the difficulties Muslim entrepreneurs and businesspeople face today.

The dhimmah (ذمة) we all have to our stakeholders becomes that much more difficult to fulfill. Dhimmah, responsibility in plain English, is a much more nuanced concept in Islam, consisting of several layers, including responsibility, inviolability, conscience, and security. 

Responsibility in our tradition
Dhimmah is the connective tissue between legal conditions of a valid sale or exchange. It operates at a deeper, moral layer as a receptacle of obligation.

Classical jurists often define it like this:

الذمة وصف شرعي يصير به الإنسان أهلاً للإلزام والالتزام

This definition reads, “Dhimmah is a legal-moral attribute by which a person becomes fit to incur and undertake obligations.”

In other words, while a contract does not create dhimmah, dhimmah allows a contract to generate a binding obligation. 

The idea of dhimmah is relevant in wide contexts, including: 

  • Contracts and obligations (e.g., commercial debt, delivery, partnerships)
  • Protection (e.g., ahl al-dhimmah under Muslim governance)
  • Moral liability - where breaking one’s promise incurs not just social, but divine consequence

Related terms in the Holy Qur’an are Ahd, Mīthāq, and Amānah. 

The market as the locus of Dhimmah
In a hadith in the collection of Al-Tirmidhi, narrated by Isma'il bin 'Ubaid bin Rifa'ah: From his father, from his grandfather, that he went with the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) to the Musalla, and he saw the people doing business so he said: 'O people of trade!' and they replied to the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) turning their necks and their gazes towards him, and he said: Indeed the merchants will be resurrected on the Day of judgement with the wicked, except the one who has Taqwa of Allah, who acts righteously and is truthful.'"

This hadith is important for us to reflect on, especially for those selling a commodity, be it a product or a service. Let’s recall that the Prophet’s instructions when entering the market are for everyone - buyer and seller. But in this hadith, the Prophet (PBUH) addressed sellers directly, placing the burden of disclosure, honesty, delivery, and quality on them. This is dhimmah. 

Reviving the spirit of covenant today
Since today’s market is everywhere, our dhimmah stays with us wherever we go. If you’re operating in e-commerce, every click means you are serving this dhimmah.

If you’re running a shop, every time someone checks out, you are accountable for this dhimmah. Each handshake to align on a B2B deal is a dhimmah. Serving our dhimmah means we are aware that every agreement is witnessed by God, whether these be supplier contracts, fairness of compensation of employees, serving as fiduciary with investors, and tech and data companies honoring agreements of consent, usage, and data privacy. 

And this is not restricted to individuals. Institutions and corporations are also morally accountable for fulfilling promises in marketing, not creating dependencies (e.g., addictive apps, exploitative lending), and honoring commitments to the environment and community. When one sells or hires, they enter into a covenant that includes fairness (ʿadl), goodwill (iḥsān), truthfulness (ṣidq), and transparency (bayān).

From contracts to covenant
Our current milieu, contractual capitalism, divides interests rather than unifying them. Our worldview demands covenantal ethics. In other words, we have transitioned from a transactional mindset towards transformative relationships.

When Muslims revive dhimmah in commerce, we stand to achieve deeper trust in markets, institutions with moral credibility, and a revival of God-consciousness (taqwā) in business dealings. We must reaffirm that the believer does not escape responsibility by “hiding behind legalese.”

The reality is that every invoice, every sale, every agreement and handshake is an entry in our book of deeds. The Prophet (s) said, “The truthful and trustworthy merchant will be with the Prophets, the truthful, and the martyrs.” (Tirmidhī)

The one who fails to honor their dhimmah becomes worthy of dhamm. That is the moral architecture built into our sacred language.

Sajjad Chowdhry is an entrepreneur and C-level executive with over two decades of global experience across venture building, strategy, investment, and strategic finance. A Columbia and Hartford Seminary graduate, he is also a co-founder of DinarStandard

Read: Reclaiming moral responsibility in commerce and work

Also read: Repositioning rights in Islamic commerce

21 Apr 2026
Opinion
OIC Economies
Rethinking Gulf security through regional resilience

In May 2025, during a historic visit to the Middle East, US President Donald Trump commended regional leaders in an unprecedented manner, stating, “The birth of a modern Middle East has been brought by the people of the region themselves, the people that are right here, the people that have lived here all their lives, developing your own sovereign countries, pursuing your own unique visions and charting your own destinies in your own way.”  

Despite this growth, which President Trump called an indigenous success, a persistent challenge remains. 

Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar heavily rely on external security guarantees. However, these guarantees have not prevented adversaries from attacking, which was their primary strategic goal.

On the contrary, US military presence has resulted in making Gulf countries more vulnerable to Iranian attacks, resulting in asymmetrical warfare where Iran is able to impose disproportionate strategic and economic impact. 

This overdependence raises a pertinent question about long-term reliance, the need for further coordination, and regional sustainability. Moreover, the recent downing of a US fighter jet, F15E, by Iran on Friday, April 3, marks a significant shift in West Asia’s security calculus. This anomaly not only exposes the fragility of US deterrence expanded through the Gulf states but also intensifies the urgency for them to revisit their defence architecture.

Across the Gulf states, core security functions such as air defence, coordination, and intelligence are either directly shared with the US or enabled through US installations. The presence of thousands of US troops in the region, along with the Central Command Forward Headquarters at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, has enabled the region's deterrence posture, in which Gulf security remains deeply embedded in American guarantees.

Two problems emerge with this forward-deployed US architecture: first, the defence system is overly reliant on US-supplied systems, such as the Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD air defence batteries, which have thwarted multiple range missiles but failed to mitigate the greater economic and strategic impact. 

Secondly, the effectiveness of the existing architecture - which is less dependent on national capabilities and regional integrated networks, but more on American command, control, and surveillance systems - limit the effective eradication of total harm. 

However, the unpredictability of these security dynamics calls for Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries to reassess the security landscape. 

Unlike European countries, Gulf countries lack a formal institutional framework that limits the full spectrum of regional integration. In the short term, Gulf states can adopt a distributed defence model that includes joint development and production of defence hardware, such as drones and missile systems, for immediate action. 

Moreover, these states can leverage Turkiye's already established military capabilities for drone production and create a balance by extending their dependence beyond the US towards Pakistani and Chinese defence systems. More critically, there is a need for cooperation in software and systems integration, including shared command-and-control (C4ISR) and early warning systems. 

The existing gap in shared detection and interception calls for a unified operational layer that enables coordinated responses rather than parallel, ineffective national actions. Moreover, growing supply chain disruptions calls for joint stockpiling, which can mitigate the risk of supply constraints and, in turn, reduce long-term dependence on external suppliers.

The Gulf’s current security dilemma is not due to a deficiency in capability but rather a lack of autonomy integration. The ongoing dependence on the United States has provided immediate protection but has also created lasting weaknesses, leaving regional countries exposed to threats they were originally intended to be protected from.

As recent developments illustrate, advanced systems without coordination and deterrence without sustainability cannot provide enduring security.

Recalibrating this model is now essential. Gulf states need to shift from relying on external support to building regional resilience, which involves strengthening local capabilities, forming diverse partnerships, and establishing collective defence strategies within platforms like the OIC. Without this change, the region could remain caught in a cycle in which security is outsourced.

Muhammad Rizwan is a research scholar at Deakin University, Melbourne, and Fatima Saif Khan is a research associate at the Centre for Governance Research, Lahore.

11 Apr 2026
Opinion
OIC Economies
Top 30 IE business schools: Diversity, complementarity & momentum shine through

The Top 30 Business Schools of the Islamic Economy ranking is a milestone moment. The ranking both recognizes efforts made by higher education institutions across the globe and highlights the importance of developing human capital with specialized knowledge of the Islamic economy. 

Three aspects of the rankings are particularly striking – diversity, complementarity, and momentum.

Diversity 
The business schools span 13 countries, including nations in the ASEAN, MENA, and EU regions. Institutions in four G20 countries – Saudi Arabia, the UK, Indonesia, and Türkiye – are featured. The schools include both longstanding leaders in higher education and relatively new institutions.

This diversity is a testament to the fact that the Islamic economy has been recognized as relevant across regions, countries, and stages of institutional development. The eagerness with which a diverse group of institutions have pursued the opportunity is a signal that it resonates with students, employers, and educators.

If the Islamic economy were not a global phenomenon, the top 30 list would look very different.

  
Complementarity 
The composition of the list reflects the crucial complementarity of institutions. INCEIF University, which topped the list was specifically established by Bank Negara Malaysia in 2005 to develop human capital for the Islamic finance industry.  

Most other institutions on the list are broad-based ones (either business schools or universities) that have added curricula, research, and ecosystem support related to the Islamic economy.

They have done so based on demand from students and employers, interest from faculty and researchers, and support from a wide range of stakeholders.  

As the sector evolves, each category of institution has an important role to play. Specialized institutions bring a unique level of focus and concentrated expertise.

Broad-based institutions link emerging Islamic economy topics with traditional business disciplines and curricula. A robust system requires both categories and fruitful exchange between the two. 

Momentum
Malaysia’s strong leadership in the rankings (home to nine of the listed 30) is a result of the country’s longstanding strategic commitment to Shariah-compliant finance and the larger Islamic economy. Sustained efforts in institution-building have borne fruit. 

In the future, I expect to see Africa-based institutions appear in the Top 30. As many as 27 of the 57 countries that comprise the OIC are in Africa, and the continent plays a vital role in intra-OIC trade and investment flows.

I likewise expect to see North American institutions make the list in the years ahead - the Islamic economy opportunity in North America has been estimated at $186 billion - business schools are a US invention, and many of the world’s leading business schools are in North America. 

I foresee further development being supported by ongoing expansion of the Islamic economy (and thus opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship) and increased appreciation for specialized education and research on the topic.

A third source of momentum will be expanding alumni networks of both specialized institutions and programs at broad-based institutions.  As we have long seen in business education, the success of alumni practitioners plays a central role in the advancement of institutions that trained them.

Dr Aamir A. Rehman is the chair of Innate Capital Partners, a New Jersey-headquartered investment vehicle, a professor at Columbia Business School and a board member of INCEIF University. The views expressed here are entirely his own and do not represent those of his affiliated institutions.

To view the Top 30 Business Schools of the Islamic Economy ranking, click here

07 Apr 2026
Opinion
Islamic Finance
Dana Syariah meltdown renews governance calls for Indonesia's Islamic fintech space

The Dana Syariah case is emerging as one of the largest Islamic fintech crises globally, casting doubt over regulatory oversight and consumer protection across the country's Shariah-compliant digital finance ecosystem. 

Founded in 2017, Dana Syariah Indonesia grew into a prominent, Sharia-compliant peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform, connecting investors with nation-wide real estate projects. The company helped channel approximately $250 million from more than 41,500 investors, offering 15–20% in annual returns.

According to public disclosures, Dana Syariah focuses on projects with pre-secured buyers, offering monthly profit distributions and structured investments with a 125% collateral coverage. The company also promoted flexible withdrawal features, which it said helped enhance investor confidence.

The license issued and the oversight maintained by Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), Indonesia's financial services regulator, inspired hope and proved decisive, according to a Dana Syariah investor forum representative. Several investors ploughed significant funds because the platform was officially licensed and monitored.

The representative added that combined with perceived Shariah oversight, extensive advertising on major media outlets, well-known brand ambassadors, multiple awards, and a reported TKB90 (90-day repayment success rate) of 99.82%, Dana Syariah appeared credible and trustworthy.  

Resilience during fintech downturn
Dana Syariah was widely viewed as a relative outlier during Indonesia’s broader peer-to-peer lending downturn that started in 2023. While several conventional and Islamic fintech investors faced rising defaults, liquidity stress, or collapse, Dana Syariah continued to survive through the Covid-19 period and the subsequent fintech funding slowdown.

Although the numbers plummeted, the company deployed $56 million in 2024, down from $107 million in 2023. As of January 2026, Dana Syariah reported a TKB0 of 100% (payment rate within zero days) and a TKB90 of 99.82% - parameters used by Indonesia’s financial services regulator.   

Dana Syariah also received several national and international awards, supported by extensive marketing campaigns and public endorsements.

Emerging repayment delays
Concerns began to emerge in the second quarter of 2025, amid mounting repayment delays. The deferrals intensified in the following months, despite the platform continuing to report a TKB90 of 99.82%. 

Investors raised alarms on their inability to withdraw funds from their accounts. In the following months, withdrawals were fully suspended.

Dana Syariah later closed its physical office and instructed employees to work remotely, alongside slower responses from customer service channels. To date, the company has not disclosed the projects that have defaulted.

Dana Syariah’s president director reportedly stated that the company had identified multiple factors contributing to the defaults, including broader economic conditions. 

Following pressure from regulators, investors, and the media, Dana Syariah updated the TKB90 indicator listed on its website to 6.92% last month, indicating a sharp plunge from previously reported levels, with only a small portion of the portfolio being repaid within 90 days.

Governance and regulatory scrutiny
Investor groups subsequently escalated their concerns to the OJK; public demonstrations calling for regulatory clarification and stronger consumer protection were simultaneously held. Investors cited Dana Syariah’s repeated public claims regarding collateralisation, pre-secured buyers, and murabaha-based transaction structures.

“We understand investment risk,” said one investor representative. “But allegations of fictitious transactions or misuse of investor funds cannot be categorised as normal risk. This points to failures in governance, transparency, and supervision.”

Questions have also been raised about regulatory oversight. Dana Syariah has operated as a licensed and supervised entity under OJK's ambit since 2021. Investor groups argue, however, that regulatory intervention came only after withdrawals had been suspended for several months.

Besides doing offline and onsite monitoring as part of its supervisory framework, OJK oversees fintech platforms through a self-regulatory organisation (SRO) model, delegating certain monitoring and governance functions to the Indonesian Fintech Lending Association (AFPI). The approach aims to strike a balance between regulatory oversight and innovation in a rapidly evolving sector.

It was further revealed that one of Dana Syariah’s founders serves as the deputy head of AFPI’s Shariah fintech funding cluster, raising questions over the effectiveness and independence of the SRO oversignt.

The company announced last December that it had begun what it described as proportional repayments to investors. Based on investor information, these repayments amounted to approximately 0.2% of outstanding obligations.

To date, Dana Syariah has not publicly disclosed a project-by-project breakdown, distinguishing performing investments from non-performing ones. It, however, claims to achieve a full resolution within one year.

In an official letter circulated to investors, Dana Syariah stated it had identified approximately $26.69 million in recoverable capacity, derived from outstanding repayments, the sale of collateral, corporate assets, and other assets subject to legal processes.

The OJK has stated that it placed Dana Syariah under supervision and initiated a special inspection, issuing a total of 15 supervisory sanctions. 

After further investigation, the criminal investigation agency of the Indonesian National Police stated in an official announcement that 99 of the 100 projects were allegedly fictitious. The alleged total losses suffered by investors could potentially reach approximately $142.36 million. 

Implications for the broader finance/fintech landscape
The Dana Syariah case is likely to reverberate beyond a single platform, intensifying scrutiny of governance standards, disclosure practices, and self-regulatory arrangements across Indonesia’s Islamic fintech sector - one of the largest and fastest-growing globally.

According to the Global Islamic Fintech Report 2025/26, published by DinarStandard and Elipses, Indonesia ranks as the world’s fourth most robust Islamic fintech ecosystem, down one position from the report's previous edition. In terms of market size, Indonesia is the world’s fifth-largest fintech market, valued at $10 billion in 2024/25 and projected to reach $17 billion by 2029.

The case is not just about cooked books or fictitious prospects, but a stark reminder of how weak governance can erode public trust, denting the credibility of the wider ecosystem.

Ali AlGhofiqi is a research analyst at DinarStandard, a growth strategy and execution management firm  

17 Feb 2026
Opinion
Islamic Finance
Central banks’ digital bid to shape global trade

A shipment can be tracked from a factory floor to a warehouse with a few clicks on a phone. The money that pays for it often cannot. 

Cross-border transfers still ricochet through correspondent banks, pick up fees along the way, and arrive days later. This mismatch - 21st-century logistics paired with 20th-century money - is one reason central banks are now pushing an idea that once sounded like science fiction: central bank digital currencies, or CBDCs.

According to the Atlantic Council’s CBDC Tracker, more than 130 countries, representing about 98% of global GDP, are exploring digital versions of sovereign cash. 

The pitch is efficiency: faster payments, fewer intermediaries, lower costs. The subtext is control. As private stablecoins and platform wallets expand, governments want a form of digital money that sits inside their legal and regulatory perimeter. 

Thus, CBDCs are forcing a more basic argument about the nature of money in a digital age. Central bank officials frame the project as monetary sovereignty: a public option for digital payments in a market dominated by private networks and dollar-backed stablecoins. Commercial banks see a threat as well as an upgrade.

If consumers can hold risk-free central bank money directly, commercial banks worry about ‘disintermediation’. Given the choice between a commercial bank deposit (which carries some risk, however minimal) and a risk-free CBDC, a large number of consumers and businesses, especially during times of financial stress, might choose to move their funds to the central bank's digital ledger.

And, as consumer deposits are the primary source of funds for commercial bank lending (or financing), a significant drain in these deposits would force banks to find alternative, potentially more expensive, sources of funding or drastically reduce the amount of credit they can extend to individuals and businesses, impacting economic growth. That is why policymakers have floated holding limits and distribution models that keep banks and regulated payment firms as the front door. 

Progress, for now, is patchy. Only a small number of CBDCs are fully live, as per the Atlantic Council, including the Bahamas’ Sand Dollar, Jamaica’s JAM-DEX and Nigeria’s eNaira. China has gone further than anyone else.

By mid-2024, its e-CNY - the digital yuan - had processed roughly 7 trillion yuan in transactions, giving Beijing the world’s biggest laboratory for state-issued digital money.

More politics, less policy
The race looks different by region, and politics often matters more than code.

In the United States, a 2025 executive order sought to bar a retail CBDC, reflecting a political fear that digital cash could become a surveillance tool. Canada has consulted the public about a “digital loonie” but says it will not proceed without a clear need and enabling legislation. Yet even in a cautious region, central banks are experimenting where the politics are quieter. 

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Project Cedar, in 2022, simulated a wholesale CBDC that could settle a foreign-exchange trade in under 15 seconds, with the two legs completing at the same moment. It was not a consumer wallet, but it was a glimpse of how trade and treasury payments might one day clear with far less friction. 

Europe is moving slowly and deliberately. The European Central Bank has entered a preparation phase for a digital euro, indicating that a pilot could begin in 2027 and that any broad launch would likely come no earlier than 2029. 

For emerging markets, CBDCs are often sold as a leapfrog: a way to reach people who have phones but no bank accounts, reduce the costs of cash, and distribute benefits more efficiently.

Though, this has faced a reality check. Nigeria’s eNaira is an example. The IMF reported fewer than a million eNaira wallets early on, under 1% of active bank accounts and estimated that 98.5% of wallets were unused in any given week. India’s pilot has been broader and more patient. The Reserve Bank of India has expanded trials across banks and merchants, and by March 2025 about 10.2 billion rupees of e-rupee was reported in circulation.

In the Islamic world, CBDCs are being discussed as tools for both competitiveness and compliance. Saudi Arabia and the UAE tested a wholesale CBDC in Project Aber; the UAE aims to launch a retail “digital dirham” by 2026 and has trialled cross-border transfers via mBridge. 

Iran, Pakistan, and Türkiye also had taken steps to explore CBDCs. That matters for the fast-growing halal economy, where certification and traceability are commercial requirements. Programmable payments could, in principle, release funds only once halal certification is confirmed and goods are delivered.

The Rub
Islamic finance adds constraints: a Shariah-aligned CBDC must avoid interest (riba) and speculative structures. Most proposals are non-interest-bearing, resembling digital cash. The harder question is governance: if rules are coded into money, who writes them, and what safeguards protect privacy and due process?

For compliance teams, CBDCs can look like the future arriving early. Identity checks, transaction limits and sanctions screening can be embedded into wallets and payment rails, producing an audit trail that cash cannot provide. That could make money laundering harder, improve tax collection and reduce fraud in trade payments. 

But the same architecture fuels public anxiety. If money becomes deeply traceable, citizens worry that routine spending will be monitored, or that payments could be blocked or frozen in ways cash cannot. Central banks promise guardrails: tiered wallets, privacy-preserving designs for small payments, and legal limits on how data can be used. In an era of polarised politics, those guardrails may matter as much as the technology.

Then there is the engineering problem that sounds boring until it breaks: interoperability. A world where each CBDC is a national silo could make cross-border trade more complex, not less. International bodies are pushing models for safe exchange among digital currencies, but agreements will require diplomacy as much as software, particularly where sanctions, data localisation and differing privacy norms collide. 

Cybersecurity adds another layer: a CBDC platform would be an irresistible target for criminals and hostile states, and a single high-profile breach would be a crisis of confidence, not just a technical failure.

CBDCs are often described as the next chapter in money. They are also a referendum on trust.

If central banks can deliver a form of digital cash that makes trade faster, meets compliance demands and does not feel like surveillance, CBDCs could become the quiet infrastructure of global commerce. 

If they cannot, the space will be filled by private alternatives that are already racing ahead - and the public sector may find it has ceded the future of money by trying to control it too tightly.

Najmul Haque Kawsar is a consultant and project manager at DinarStandard

08 Jan 2026
Opinion
OIC Economies
Is Senegal tapping into the $3tn halal economy with its new economic plan?

Following recent political changes, Senegal's new government has promised a systemic "rupture" with the past, charting an ambitious course towards sovereignty and prosperity. But beyond the political headlines, what does this new vision actually look like? And what if one of the most powerful tools for achieving it lies in an often-overlooked economic ecosystem: the global halal economy? 

A deep dive into the government's policy declarations and strategic vision reveals a surprising and profound alignment with the principles of halal-conscious development. This is not just a political shift; it's a pragmatic strategy positioning values-based economics as the core engine of national transformation.

1. The rupture is about more than politics, it's about rewriting the economic playbook

For 64 years since its independence, Senegal's economic model has remained largely unchanged: exporting raw materials with minimal local processing and importing finished goods. The new government has identified this dependency as a core vulnerability that must be decisively broken.

Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko was unequivocal in his policy declaration: "Senegal has remained trapped in the colonial economic model, exporting its raw materials (gold, fish, peanuts, phosphate, zircon…), with little added value and importing finished products."

This declaration signals a fundamental shift towards industrialization and the creation of domestic value chains. This is more than a parallel trend with the halal economy; it is a direct enabler of "Vision 2050."

By building a halal-compliant agribusiness sector, Senegal simultaneously addresses its goal of food sovereignty and taps into a premium global market. Similarly, developing a local halal pharmaceutical industry, another national priority, meets both public health needs and industrial ambitions by establishing an ethical, traceable production ecosystem from raw materials to finished medicines.

2. The grand vision will be fueled by values-based, domestic capital

The new administration, under the leadership of President Bassirou Diomaye Faye, has strengthened the focus on good governance and upholding strong values by establishing a Directorate of Religious Affairs and promoting the integration of Arabic-language graduates.

To finance its ambitious national projects, the government is not relying solely on external debt. A central pillar of its strategy is the mobilization of domestic savings through innovative financial mechanisms aligned with its values.

The general policy statement explicitly stipulates that this will involve the use of Islamic finance instruments to enable Senegalese citizens to invest in their country's future.

"In this regard, conventional or Islamic type Collective Investment Schemes (CIS) will be used, depending on the preferences of Senegalese savers. These CIS may subscribe to (i) so-called patriotic bonds and sukuks issued by the public treasury..."

The strategic implication is profound: Islamic finance is not being cordoned off as a niche product but integrated as a mainstream instrument of fiscal sovereignty. By offering instruments like sukuk (Islamic bonds), the government is creating a direct channel for citizens to fund national infrastructure and strategic industries in a manner that aligns with their values.

3. The demand isn't just top-down, it's roaring from the ground up

The government's strategic focus on Sharia-compliant finance is not being created in a vacuum; it is a direct response to a powerful, pre-existing demand from the Senegalese people. A recent government bond issuance provides the most potent evidence of this.

The bond was massively oversubscribed, demonstrating a clear public appetite to invest in the nation's future. However, this success was accompanied by a significant public outcry: many citizens complained they were unable to participate because the conventional interest-based structure of the bonds was not compliant with their Islamic principles.

This event served as an undeniable, bottom-up signal to policymakers. It revealed a vast, untapped reservoir of domestic capital waiting to be mobilized through halal-compliant channels. More than just a financial data point, it represented a grassroots push for a more inclusive financial system that respects and integrates the values of the majority, transforming citizen savings into a powerful force for national development.

4. Senegal is strategically positioning itself as the gateway to a $3 trillion African opportunity

Senegal's vision is not happening in isolation. It is a calculated strategy to capture a significant share of a massive and underserved global market, positioning the nation as a continental leader.

The Senegal halal strategic framework is poised to put this ambition into context with compelling data:

* The global halal economy is valued at over $3 trillion.
* Africa has a growing Muslim population of over 500 million.
* Senegal, with its stability and Islamic heritage, aims to become the halal hub of West Africa.

By aligning its national development goals with the halal economy, Senegal is not just reforming its internal structures; it is building a bridge to a vast economic opportunity.

The strategy aims to position the country as the indispensable entry point for global halal trade, investment, and innovation on the African continent. This strategic intent was concretely manifested by a pioneering benchmarking mission, led by the Senegalese SME Agency (ADEPME), to Malaysia, featuring local SMEs at the Malaysia International Halal Showcase, recognized globally as the foremost halal industry platform.

5. The vision is holistic and anchored in strong values

The halal economy is far more than just finance. It is a complete ecosystem covering sectors like food, tourism, modest fashion, pharmaceuticals, and technology. This holistic nature is perfectly reflected in the government's repeated emphasis on building a Senegal "ancré dans des valeurs fortes" (anchored in strong values).

This holistic vision transforms the halal economy from a niche market into a comprehensive development platform.

It creates a self-reinforcing ecosystem where progress in halal finance fuels investment in halal tourism, which in turn creates demand for halal food products and modest fashion, diversifying the economy and de-risking the nation's development path.

This approach directly supports key goals in "Vision 2050," such as achieving food sovereignty through agribusiness, creating local jobs through textile and tourism industries, and building strategic capacity in pharmaceuticals.

Conclusion: a new blueprint for development?

Senegal's new economic direction represents far more than a simple change in leadership. It is a meticulously crafted development strategy where the principles of the halal economy serve as a core pillar for achieving national sovereignty, industrialization, and shared prosperity.

By breaking with a post-colonial economic model and embracing a holistic, values-based approach, Senegal is tapping into both the deep-seated preferences of its people and a multi-trillion-dollar global market. As Senegal embarks on this journey, could its unique blend of sovereign ambition and values-based economics provide a new blueprint for development across the African continent?

Mamadou Ndiaye is a Senegalese entrepreneur working in emerging technologies for over two decades. He was named as one of the 40 most influential personalities across the global halal economy in 2022

01 Dec 2025
Opinion
View all Opinions
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