Vietnam made a decisive move earlier this year when Decree 127 came into effect, giving the country its first comprehensive legal framework for halal certification, labelling, and traceability. At the centre of that effort is HALCERT, the government body tasked with building Vietnam's halal industry and securing international market access by 2030. 



Salaam Gateway spoke with HALCERT Director Ramlan Osman about the sectors driving Vietnam's halal export push, the infrastructure gaps that still need to be closed, and how the country is positioning itself as a credible halal hub in Southeast Asia.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

1. What is HALCERT's role within Vietnam's broader halal ecosystem, and how does its certification scheme align with international standards (such as those recognised by GCC markets, Malaysia's JAKIM, or Indonesia's BPJPH) to ensure Vietnamese halal products gain cross-border acceptance? 

HalCert was established on 24 April 2024 as a government body under the Ministry of Trade, based on decision (10/QD - FT), dated February 14, 2023.  The objective behind the creation of HalCert is to strengthen international cooperation, and to build and develop Vietnam's Halal Industry by 2030. As for alignment with other certifications and standards, Decree 127 provides the emphasis on prioritising references to OIC/SMIIC and from widely recognised international standards such as Jakim, BPJBP etc. This is important for Vietnamese products in gaining international acceptance.

2. What are the main sectors driving Vietnam's halal export ambitions, and what gaps currently exist in infrastructure, supply chain, or producer awareness that HALCERT is working to address?

The three key areas that need to be focused are agriculture, top 20 producers meeting the OIC importation needs, food manufacturing (ready-to-eat snack ingredients), and Muslim-friendly services (accommodation, tour sites, service providers, and agents).

There are also improvements needed in the infrastructure to accommodate halal requirements such as qualified manpower, structured learning programmes, development centre, and grassroots programmes.  As for supply chain, we need to build halal logistics capabilities including trace and trace from farm to fork.

Some other areas where work still needs to be done:
Coordination with colleges on learning and development for halal and manufacturing courses;  coordination with provinces on introducing certified halal courses to logistics provider companies as a start and working on having more players embrace halal at coastal ports in order to take on a bigger role in halal logistics.

3. What is Vietnam's strategic vision for positioning itself in the global halal economy, and how is HALCERT collaborating with government bodies, foreign certification authorities, and industry players to build a credible and competitive halal hub in Southeast Asia?

 18 Memorandums of understanding (MOUs)s have been signed, including a G2G with Brunei, Singapore, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Bahrain, and Turkiye. Furthermore, Vietnam is now also a member of the ASEAN halal Council and is hosting a conference in Vietnam from 8 -9 July on "An Emerging Destination for Halal Tourism." We are also discussing with SMIIC to be an observer member during SMIIC general meetings, and finally, we are in talks with local developers and manufacturing entrepreneurs to develop a halal manufacturing zone at the port city of Hai Phong, which would be spread over an area comprising 30 hectares of land.

4. Although Vietnam is not a Muslim-majority country, its strategic location connecting China, ASEAN, and the Pacific is part of its value proposition to halal markets. However, trust in halal certification from a non-OIC country can be a challenge. How is HALCERT building credibility with Muslim-majority importing countries, and does it see Vietnam's non-Muslim status as a liability or as something that can be reframed as a neutral, commercially rigorous advantage?

Although Vietnam's Muslim population is estimated at 50,000 to 60,000 out of 1.2 million, making it a minority Muslim nation, similar in profile to Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the country has bigger ambitions of positioning Vietnam as a regional — and ultimately global — halal food hub. As a result, HALCERT is pursuing an international partnership strategy, signing memorandums of understanding with the UAE's MOIAT, Saudi Arabia's SASO, and the GCC's GAC. 

5. What are some of the structural bottlenecks that HALCERT sees as preventing Vietnam from expanding its halal industry? Is it a lack of awareness, the cost of certification, the absence of internationally recognised certification bodies, or other factors?

Two challenges continue to hamper halal commercialisation in Vietnam. The first is a lack of awareness. Despite HALCERT having presented its work to close to ten provinces from north to south, many provincial authorities are not doing enough to help farmers and rural communities adopt halal standards in a commercially meaningful way. The second challenge is of cost: many micro-enterprises and SMEs find the $1,000 certification and audit process difficult to absorb. Decree 127, however, has begun to address this directly, instructing the Ministries of Industry and Trade, Agriculture and Environment, and Culture, Sports and Tourism to provide financial assistance to help businesses obtain halal certification, achieve Muslim-friendly status, and participate in overseas halal trade expos.

6. Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh approved a project in February 2023 to strengthen international cooperation and develop Vietnam's halal industry through 2030, positioning it as a new economic pillar. With Decree 127 now in effect, how does HALCERT measure progress, and are the 2030 targets still realistic?

Halcert started on April 24, 2024, one year after the Prime Minister’s declaration on the setting up of halal development and the promotion of halal economy and commercialisation of agriculture, aquaculture, and food manufacturing in the country. Since the inception of Halcert, we have travelled across the country to promote halal and Muslim-friendly activities to more than 3,000 entrepreneurs, exporters, government officials, university students, academicians, and the public over the last two years. 

Ministry of Science and Technology has been given a central role under Decree 127 in coordinating the halal sector by setting quality standards, shaping development policy, and ensuring that exporters, traders, researchers, trainers, and consultants operate in line with both domestic law and internationally recognised halal standards. Based on the number of events organised across different provinces over the past year — with strong involvement from both the public and private sectors — I am confident that Vietnam's halal Vision 2030 targets are not only achievable but could well be surpassed.

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s 57 member states are home to some of the world’s fastest-growing urban centers, and their capitals capture much of the demographic weight of the Muslim world.

From South Asian megacities absorbing millions of rural migrants to Gulf capitals transformed by labour migration and petrostate investment, these cities illustrate how population and power are increasingly concentrated in large urban agglomerations. Taken together, the ten largest OIC capitals account for well over 100 million people in their contiguous built‑up areas.
 

1. Jakarta, Indonesia — 41.9 million

Jakarta ranks as the largest capital city in the OIC and the most populous city in the world in the UN’s 2025 dataset. Its huge urban footprint reflects the long-term concentration of population, investment, and government activity on Java, as well as the growth of the wider Jabodetabek metropolitan region.

2. Dhaka, Bangladesh — 36.6 million

Dhaka is the second-largest OIC capital and one of the fastest-growing large cities in the world. Its expansion has been driven by rural-to-urban migration, garment-sector employment, and the city’s role as Bangladesh’s political and economic core.

3. Cairo, Egypt — 25.6 million

Cairo is the largest city in Africa and the only non-Asian city among the world’s top ten urban areas in the UN’s 2025 release. Its scale reflects long-running demographic concentration along the Nile corridor and persistent migration from other parts of Egypt into the capital region.

4. Tehran, Iran — 9.2 million

Tehran remains one of the largest capitals in Western Asia and a major administrative, financial, and cultural center. The city’s growth has been shaped by internal migration, centralization of state functions, and the pull of the national capital on surrounding regions.

5. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia — 8.4 million

Kuala Lumpur is one of the most economically significant capitals in the OIC and a major hub for trade, finance, and the Islamic economy. Its urban growth reflects Malaysia’s sustained urbanization and the wider expansion of the Klang Valley metropolitan region.

6. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia — 6.9 million

Riyadh has grown rapidly from a small desert settlement into a major metropolitan capital. Oil-driven development, labor migration, and large-scale state investment have transformed the city into one of the fastest-expanding capitals in the OIC.

7. Khartoum, Sudan — 6.8 million

Khartoum’s urban agglomeration, which includes Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North, is the largest capital area in sub-Saharan Africa within the OIC. Its population estimate should be treated cautiously because Sudan’s conflict has likely altered settlement patterns and displacement flows since 2023.

8. Amman, Jordan — 6.4 million

Amman’s growth has been shaped by successive waves of displacement, including Palestinians, Iraqis, and Syrians, alongside natural increase. The city’s size is unusually large relative to Jordan’s overall population, giving the country a strong concentration of people and services in the capital.

9. Baghdad, Iraq — 6.4 million

Baghdad remains one of the largest Arab capitals in the UN dataset and has long been a major center of political power and urban settlement. Its current size reflects historic centrality, post-2003 migration, and ongoing reconstruction and demographic pressure.

10. Kabul, Afghanistan — 5.6 million

Kabul’s rise into the upper tier of large capitals has been driven largely by internal displacement and the concentration of opportunity and services in the capital. Despite political uncertainty, the UN’s 2025 estimate still places Kabul among the largest OIC capitals.

Methodology
This ranking uses the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects 2025 capital-city file, which reports mid-2025 population estimates for capital cities defined by the Degree of Urbanization. That means the figures describe densely populated urban areas and are not limited to administrative city boundaries.

For consistency, the list includes capitals of all 57 OIC member states and uses the UN’s capital-city designation as the basis for comparison. In conflict-affected cases such as Khartoum and Kabul, the figures should be treated as modelled estimates rather than precise counts because population movement and damage to administrative systems can affect accuracy.

Why it matters
The list underscores a central fact about the OIC world: political capitals are often also giant demographic magnets. In South Asia and parts of the Middle East, capital-city growth is tied not only to national governance but also to labor migration, regional inequality, displacement, and the concentration of infrastructure and services.

It also shows that the Islamic world’s largest urban centers are overwhelmingly Asian, with Cairo standing out as the only African capital in the global top ten. That pattern matters for understanding everything from housing pressure and transport demand to labor markets and urban policy.

Source note
This article is based on the UN World Urbanization Prospects 2025 capital-city dataset and the UN’s summary release on the 2025 revision. The ranking should be cited as: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2025 Revision, Online Edition.

Against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical tensions and supply-chain uncertainty, China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) signals continuity with earlier policy priorities while sharpening its focus on industrial strength, technological self-reliance, energy security, and high-standard opening up.

For the 57 member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the plan matters because it points to where China is likely to buy, build, and compete through 2030. That makes it relevant not only as a domestic policy blueprint, but also as a guide to China’s external economic behaviour.
 

What the plan prioritises

Compared with its predecessor, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan appears to place even greater emphasis on advanced manufacturing, innovation, domestic demand, green transition, and high-quality ‘Belt and Road’ cooperation. It also highlights emerging technologies such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and energy-related innovation, while reinforcing the importance of technological self-reliance and supply-chain resilience.

The plan sets several specific measurable targets. On technology and innovation, it targets R&D spending growth of at least 7% annually. On energy, it targets a 17% reduction in carbon intensity relative to the 2025 baseline, and a 16 to 20% increase in energy production capacity, driven mainly by renewables. 

On agriculture, the plan targets grain production capacity of 725 million tonnes by 2030, alongside greater seed self-sufficiency and more integrated digital farming systems. On the digital economy, it targets value-added output reaching 12.5% of GDP by 2030, with AI given significantly greater prominence than in the previous plan.

This resilience push also reflects broader geopolitical and supply-chain instability. As Dr Yu Jie, Senior Research Fellow on China at Chatham House, observed: “Conflicts, geopolitical rivalry and the COVID-19 pandemic have exposed the fragility of global supply networks. And intensifying technology restrictions by advanced economies have underscored how dependence on foreign inputs can constrain national development.”

She added that the turmoil in the Gulf would only reinforce Beijing’s conviction. “Instability in several of the world’s most important energy suppliers illustrates how quickly geopolitical crises can ripple through global markets. For a country like China, which remains the world’s largest energy importer and a central hub in global manufacturing networks, the war is a stark reminder of the risks inherent in overreliance on external conditions beyond its control.”

The plan also reflects China’s effort to align economic development with national security. In practical terms, that means reducing vulnerability to external shocks, strengthening industrial chains, and ensuring that energy, technology, and manufacturing policy are more tightly integrated.

This has implications for OIC countries. China’s push for resilience and self-sufficiency may sustain demand for energy, minerals, and industrial inputs, but it will also increase competition for countries that are trying to move up the manufacturing ladder themselves.

The OIC foundation that already exists

The ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ has already created a substantial infrastructure footprint across several Muslim-majority economies. Chinese-linked economic zones, agricultural cooperation centres, transport corridors, ports, and industrial parks already exist in parts of Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

The scale of this existing base is documented. Ten Chinese-linked economic zones are recorded across OIC countries — in Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Nigeria (two zones), Djibouti, Pakistan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE — covering industries from textiles and automotive assembly to petrochemicals and clean energy.

Four Chinese agricultural technology centres are operational in OIC member states in Africa: Sudan, Cameroon, Mauritania, and Senegal, covering crop cultivation, rice, irrigation, and subsistence farming. Cumulative BRI engagement since 2013 has reached $1.399 trillion, comprising roughly $837 billion in construction contracts and $561 billion in non-financial investments. In 2025, the Middle East was the second-largest recipient of BRI engagement globally, receiving $39.4 billion.

That existing base matters because the 15th Five-Year Plan does not start from zero. Its emphasis on quality, integration, and innovation can be read as an attempt to upgrade and better coordinate the infrastructure and partnerships China has already built.

This creates both opportunity and risk for OIC states. Countries that can align their industrial strategies with China’s priorities may attract more investment, technology transfer, and market access. Countries that remain passive may find themselves more deeply embedded in Chinese supply chains without gaining enough value-added production in return. 

Identifying where the opportunities are

Agriculture: China’s focus on food security, smart agriculture, and seed innovation creates room for agricultural cooperation, machinery exports, and value-chain integration. OIC countries with strong agricultural sectors could position themselves as suppliers of food, inputs, and processing capacity.

Manufacturing: China’s continued industrial upgrading will intensify competition in labour-intensive and mid-tech manufacturing. OIC economies seeking industrialisation will need to specialise, improve productivity, and target niches where they can compete effectively.

Green energy: The plan’s green transition agenda supports new opportunities in renewables, batteries, green hydrogen, grid infrastructure, and energy-efficient manufacturing. This is especially relevant for OIC countries with solar, wind, or critical mineral potential.

Connectivity and trade: High-quality Belt and Road cooperation may continue to support ports, railways, logistics corridors, and digital trade systems across OIC regions. That could improve trade efficiency, but only if projects are commercially viable and fiscally sustainable.

The risks to manage

The biggest structural risk for many OIC countries is increased competition from Chinese firms in manufacturing and exports. As China moves further up the value chain, it may become harder for emerging industrial economies to build export capacity in sectors where Chinese firms already have scale, efficiency, and policy backing.

A second risk is technological dependence. Chinese firms may expand exports of digital infrastructure, automation, and industrial software, but these partnerships can also create dependence on Chinese standards, platforms, and data governance systems.

For oil- and gas-exporting OIC states, the energy transition is another medium-term challenge. China will continue to need hydrocarbons, but its demand mix may gradually shift toward cleaner energy, strategic minerals, and inputs linked to electrification and advanced manufacturing.

Hong Kong’s possible role

Hong Kong may also become a more important bridge between China’s industrial base and OIC markets. Its strengths in finance, legal services, trading, and international connectivity could make it a useful platform for firms trying to reach Muslim-majority markets.

That said, the halal and certification gap should not be overstated. Hong Kong can help facilitate market access and trust-building, but any claim that it can single-handedly solve the challenge would be too strong. The more realistic view is that it can support a wider ecosystem of trade, certification, and service provision.

This view was echoed by Sharifa Leung, Managing Director, 3 Hani Enterprises Ltd when speaking to Salaam Gateway. She said: “By bridging rigid regulatory frameworks with modern ecosystem safety, Hong Kong and Macau can translate China’s Belt and Road vision into tangible economic trust, unlocking multi-trillion-dollar OIC markets through standardised, premium halal and tourism experiences.”

How OIC countries should respond

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan is best understood as a framework for selective engagement, and not automatic alignment. For OIC countries, it creates opportunities in trade, investment, energy transition, infrastructure, and industrial upgrading — but only if they negotiate carefully and build stronger domestic capabilities.

OIC governments are likely to do best if they engage China selectively rather than passively. That means negotiating sector by sector, insisting on local value addition, and ensuring that projects include technology transfer, maintenance capacity, and realistic financing terms.

It also means coordinating more regionally where possible. States with complementary strengths — in energy, logistics, agriculture, or manufacturing — can improve their bargaining position if they act with greater coherence.

The central point is simple: China is moving up the ladder, and OIC countries will benefit most if they do the same. Those that focus only on commodity exports or debt-heavy infrastructure risk becoming more dependent on Chinese supply chains without capturing enough of the value.

Sidr & Stone was carved out of a need to honour centuries-old prophetic remedies. Nigella Sativa, named in Sunnah as a powerful healing tool, and widely overlooked in modern medicine for years, has gained ground in recent years for its antioxidant and immune-supporting properties. 

We speak with Yusuf Elsayed, founder of Sidr & Stone, on the underlying need to create the enterprise, and his overarching intent to converge traditional healing with modern technique. 

Salaam Gateway: What inspired you to launch Sidr & Stone, and what market gap were you aiming to fill?
 

Elsayed: I came to this from a tech sales career, and as an Imam I'd long been struck by how seriously our tradition takes certain natural foods — black seed, olive oil, honey — and how poorly the modern market serves them.

The gap was trust. The category is full of bold claims and very little proof; brands talk about potency but almost none publish an independently verified figure. I wanted to build a brand around the foods of the Sunnah, held to modern quality standards — taking something 1,400 years old seriously enough to lab-test it.

Salaam Gateway: How do you source and verify the quality of your ingredients?
 

Elsayed: Sourcing first, then proof. For our black seed oil I personally evaluated more than 36 suppliers across several countries before settling on cold-pressed Ethiopian Nigella sativa, widely regarded as a high-quality seed source.

We then commissioned independent European laboratory testing rather than relying on a supplier's word — our oil is verified at 2.67% thymoquinone (the active compound used to judge black seed oil), and we publish the certificate of analysis openly on our quality assurance page. We keep it cold-pressed and unfiltered so the natural compounds aren't stripped out.

Salaam Gateway:The wellness market is crowded and often criticised for weak regulation. How do you build trust with consumers?

Elsayed: By being verifiable rather than loud. We don't chase the biggest number — we publish only what we can evidence. The certificate of analysis is the heart of it: a customer doesn't have to take our word on potency, they can see the independent lab result. I'd rather state an honest, verified 2.67% thymoquinone than an unverifiable higher figure. In a category criticised for weak regulation, transparency is the product.

Salaam Gateway: Where do you see Sidr & Stone in the next three to five years regarding product expansion, markets, or partnerships?
 

Elsayed: We began with cold-pressed black seed oil and olive oil; sidr honey and oregano oil are next — all within the same thesis of traditional, minimally-processed foods.

We serve the UK, EU and US and want to deepen those markets rather than spread too thin. On partnerships, I'm most interested in retailers and platforms that value third-party verification, and in continuing to publish our testing openly so the whole category is pushed toward proof over marketing.

The global sukuk market has undergone significant structural evolution since its modern inception, adapting to investor appetites, regulatory frameworks, and market dynamics while navigating persistent tensions between Shariah authenticity and financial functionality and adapting to the changing needs and dynamics of the global financial market and stakeholder appetites. The following evolutionary depiction, adapted from Yagci, Izhar, and Turkhan Ali (2025), traces this trajectory:

AAOIFI Shariah Standard 62 (SS62) represents a pivotal development in the evolution of the global  sukūk market. At its core, the standard seeks to address a long-standing structural imbalance—namely, the pre-dominance of asset-based sukuk structures that grant investors only beneficial ownership rather than the asset-backed arrangements grounded in genuine ownership and effective risk transfer. While this corrective shift is firmly anchored in classical Shariah principles, its implications for contemporary financial markets are significant and potentially far-reaching.

By requiring substantive ownership and the assumption of risk, SS62 realigns sukuk structures with foundational Shariah maxims such as al-ghunm bi al-ghurm and al-kharāj bi al-ḍamān. The standard also carries important implications for tradability, placing greater emphasis on the actual composition and nature of underlying asset pools rather than relying solely on numerical thresholds or ratios. In doing so, it reinforces the legitimacy of jurisprudential approaches where ownership and risk-bearing are genuine and substantive.

 

In response to these developments, the Islamic Development Bank Institute has conceptualized two complementary institutional mechanisms: the Ṣukūk Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Ṣukūk Enhancement Fund (SEF). The DFC is designed to issue asset-backed sukuk to finance development projects while avoiding the need for governments to transfer strategic public assets. The SEF, in turn, functions as a mutual risk-sharing platform among issuers, strengthening credit quality and improving pricing without reliance on external guarantees.

Together, these mechanisms provide a practical pathway for the gradual transition toward SS62-compliant sukuk structures. While the DFC facilitates the large-scale issuance of asset-backed sukuk for sovereign and development financing, the SEF mitigates systemic risk and expands access to authentic sukuk for smaller issuers, including SMEs. Collectively, they offer scalable institutional solutions capable of supporting the implementation of AAOIFI SS62 while minimizing disruption to existing market dynamics.

Dr. Hylmun Izhar is a Senior Research Economist at the Islamic Development Bank Institute (IsDBI). Dr. Turkhan Ali Abdul Manap is a Senior Research Economist at IsDBI. Yahya Rehman is Associate Manager, Knowledge Leaders Section, at IsDBI.

Muslims comprise just 16% of Singapore’s population, yet halal products and services have become increasingly mainstream across the city-state. From multinational restaurant chains securing certifications to digital halal verification systems, the country is positioning itself as a gateway for the global halal economy.

“Singapore has moved beyond niche market appeal to become a credible, trusted hub,” Dewi Suratty, founder and CEO of Singapore-based halal consultancy Dawn Horizon tells Salaam Gateway. 

Singapore’s food service industry offers perhaps the clearest evidence of the halal sector’s growing appeal – more than 4,000 of Singapore’s 23,600 food establishments are halal-certified, growing at roughly 10% annually.

Major fast-food chains including McDonald’s, KFC, Pizza Hut, and Subway operate halal-certified outlets across the island, while delivery platforms such as GrabFood and Foodpanda offer halal search filters.

In February, Canadian coffee chain Tim Hortons and South Korean bakery-café giant Paris Baguette secured halal certification for 17 and 20 Singaporean outlets, respectively. Singapore’s only halal-certified Filipino eatery, Nanay’s Kitchen, opened its fourth outlet in April, while Gyusei Gyukatsu Wagyu-Steakhouse introduced the country’s first halal A5 wagyu katsu earlier this year. 

Meanwhile, local meat importer and processor Lim Traders recently launched a direct-to-consumer platform, The Halal Meat Specialist, further expanding the local halal retail landscape.

Convenience retail is also evolving. In late 2025, 7-Eleven rolled out halal-certified Korean snacks nationwide, while Thai restaurant Pratunam Plus by Soi Thai Soi Nice became halal-certified nearly a decade after first opening. 

For consumers, the change reflects a dramatic expansion of choice. “Halal doesn’t mean just traditional Malay or Indian Muslim food anymore,” says Suratty. 

“We’ve got halal-certified Japanese, Chinese, Western, even fine dining. That diversity has removed a lot of friction from consumer choice. You can access halal food at a hawker for four dollars or at an eighty-dollar fine dining establishment. That’s inclusive access across economic segments.”

Building cross-border trust through regulation

Singapore began developing its halal governance framework in 1978 through the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, also known as MUIS, which oversees halal certification and Muslim affairs under the Administration of Muslim Law Act. 

That foundation is becoming more important as Southeast Asian nations seek to strengthen cross-border halal cooperation. A recent report by Indonesia’s halal inspection body highlighted collaboration between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore as a major opportunity to establish ASEAN as a global halal hub.

“When a product carries the MUIS halal stamp, traders in the GCC, Malaysia and Indonesia know exactly what they’re getting,” says Suratty.

Singapore is also modernising its certification systems through digital halal certificates introduced by MUIS last October, enabling consumers to instantly verify certifications via their mobile devices.  

“The amendment grants MUIS robust legal authority to govern its foreign halal certification bodies (FHCB) recognition scheme, enabling it to impose recognition conditions, prosecute certificate forgery, and establish a structured appeals process,” says Muhammad Faizal bin Othman, director of halal development at MUIS.

The move reflects a wider effort to strengthen the integrity of imported halal products, which is critical given Singapore’s reliance on food imports.

Alongside the digital certification rollout, MUIS launched an online portal for its enhanced FHCB recognition framework, streamlining the application and renewal process for overseas certification bodies. To date, the scheme has onboarded 88 recognised FHCBs from across the globe.

MUIS has also introduced the comprehensive halal risk management framework, replacing a one-size-fits-all approach with a more targeted risk-based methodology.

“Establishments are assessed across three dimensions - the nature and scope of certification, the robustness of controls in place, and their compliance track record,” explains Othman.

“Higher-risk establishments are subject to more frequent inspections, while those with strong compliance records qualify for extended certification validity of three to five years.” 

The framework directly links regulatory scrutiny to performance, encouraging businesses to maintain high standards while rewarding strong compliance.

Singapore-based companies are also expanding their halal manufacturing footprint beyond borders to meet growing regional demand. Food manufacturing group OTS Holdings opened a new $9.7 million facility in Malaysia last October that is expected to triple its halal production capacity from 60 tonnes to 200 tonnes per month.

“With two food manufacturing facilities in Singapore and one in Malaysia, we are contributing to the expansion of Singapore’s halal economy through improved efficiency and halal production capacity,” says Ong Shiya, senior manager for group corporate marketing at OTS Holdings. 

For many manufacturers, Singapore’s appeal extends beyond domestic demand.

“A company manufacturing specialty food in Singapore can reach Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the GCC with confidence that MUIS certification will be recognised,” says Suratty. 

The market outlook remains strong -  Singapore’s halal meat market was valued at more than $6.5 billion in 2024 and is projected to reach $7.7 billion by 2027, according to Straits Research. 

Food security drives next phase of growth

While consumer demand remains strong, Suratty believes a more pressing force is shaping the future of halal across the region.

“What’s really accelerating halal sector growth across Asia now is something more pressing: food security imperatives,” explains Suratty. “Covid-19 and recent geopolitical tensions have made supply chain diversification impossible to ignore.”

Innovations such as vertical farming, aquaculture, plant-based proteins, precision fermentation, and cultivated meat are increasingly intersecting with halal standards. “The halal angle makes these innovations market-ready not just locally, but regionally,” she adds.