But beyond the shattered infrastructure, the tipped over desks, the dangling wood beams and broken glass, another crisis has unfolded: a catastrophic shortage of digital equipment.
The conflict has decimated institutions, disrupted logistics, and triggered a strict blockade that predicates on the harsh understanding of labelling laptops, smartphones, and their spare parts as ‘dual-use’ military items. Securing tech in this new reality has become virtually impossible.
The context is both instructive and overwhelming: For millions around the world, a broken laptop is an inconvenience. In Gaza, it can mean the sudden demise of a university education, the loss of a family's primary income, or complete isolation from the outside world.
By cutting off access to technology, the blockade has suffocated daily life, disproportionately impacting students, remote workers, and a broader workforce desperate to link up with and serve the global economy.
“Gaza is facing an extreme, system-wide shortage of digital devices,” Maha Alfarra, managing director at the Galilee Foundation, a UK-registered charity focused on Palestinian education and humanitarian initiatives, tells Salaam Gateway.
Image Courtesy: Shutterstock
“Most laptops, tablets, and smartphones were destroyed during the war, and no new electronics have been allowed into Gaza since October 2023.”
The few devices that survive or slip through the blockade are priced astronomically. A basic laptop that once cost $400 now commands $1,000 or more. If a student's laptop breaks, they face an impossible choice: purchase a replacement at a hyper-inflated price or drop out entirely.
“Prices for the few remaining devices have risen to more than five times their original cost, far beyond the reach of most families and institutions,” Alfarra adds.
“At Al-Azhar University-Gaza, a recent $10,000 support fund was only enough to purchase five laptops, illustrating the scale of scarcity.”
Human capital, skillset at risk
The hardware shortage is triggering a much broader crisis: the erosion of Gaza's talent base and the demise of entire livelihoods.
Before the escalation, Gaza had fostered a resilient digital workforce. Through local incubators and university programs, young Palestinians built careers in software development, graphic design, and digital marketing, bypassing physical borders through the Internet. Today, those professionals are struggling to remain visible to global employers.
“Losing a laptop means losing an immediate economic lifeline or halting university progress entirely,” Wisam Elswerki, a Gaza-based content developer who works with humanitarian organizations, tells Salaam Gateway.
After losing his own equipment, Elswerki was forced to manage his workload entirely from a mobile phone. “Trying to handle professional documentation, join virtual meetings, and review files on a small screen - while dealing with erratic power and network coverage - turns standard work into a daily test of endurance.”
“A simple task takes four times longer than it should.”
Without the ability to work consistently, client relationships wither, and hard-earned technical skills inevitably decline.
“The greatest long-term risk is not the loss of laptops or smartphones - it’s the gradual loss of the human capital that took years to build,” Mohammed Abu Hassira, a development professional based in Gaza, tells Salaam Gateway.
Abu Hassira notes that before October 2023, remote work was one of the few accessible pathways to financial independence, particularly for women.
“Digital work depends on continuity,” he explains. “One of Gaza's greatest strengths has always been its people. Preserving digital talent and reconnecting professionals with global markets should therefore be viewed not only as humanitarian support, but as a strategic investment in Gaza's long-term economic recovery.”
In the face of these extreme restrictions, Palestinians are engineering makeshift solutions using damaged equipment and pre-digital adaptations.
When laptops and computers are unavailable, students use mobile phones to access course materials on platforms like Moodle or Google Classroom, relying on WhatsApp as their primary tool for peer-led engagement.
Families frequently pool their resources, sharing a single rented laptop among multiple siblings just to keep their education alive. Tech workers and freelancers travel through destroyed neighborhoods to reach makeshift, solar-powered co-working hubs. There, they share access to electricity to charge devices, rotating in shifts to maintain their income streams.
“Despite severe logistical restrictions, several organizations have launched creative initiatives to restore digital access,” Elswerki notes.
He highlights entities like Gaza Sky Geeks and Taqat Gaza, which have been instrumental in setting up community tech spaces, as well as Academic Solidarity with Palestine, an initiative distributing free e-SIMs to help Gazan students and professors re-establish basic connectivity.
“While the gap between supply and demand remains massive, these efforts keep Gaza's workforce and student body connected,” he says.
Integrated ecosystems are the sole way forward
Standard charity models are no longer viable in an environment stripped of basic power and connectivity.
“Companies can play a meaningful role, but only if support goes beyond simply donating devices,” warns Alfarra. “In Gaza’s current conditions, digital access depends on three things simultaneously: devices, power, and connectivity. Effective programs therefore need to be integrated and resilient.”
To build these ecosystems, international bodies are shifting their focus from individual distribution to shared resources. Rather than dropping single laptops into an infrastructural vacuum, they are now equipping collective workspaces.
Investing in decentralized, solar-powered computer labs and coworking spaces allows hundreds of people to use reliable equipment through shift schedules. UN agencies such as UNESCO and the UNDP have already piloted similar approaches.
“UNESCO has provided laptops through Temporary Learning Spaces, supporting more than 10,000 students, while UNICEF continues to procure ICT equipment for Palestinian education systems," Alfarra says.
"Furthermore, a major initiative led by Education Above All and UNDP distributed 10,000 tablets and built 100 digital learning centres equipped with reliable power and internet access.”
Other NGOs - including US-registered HEAL Palestine, West Bank-headquartered Teach for Palestine and US-based GiveInternet - have contributed crucial hardware, connectivity tools, and remote learning assistance. These initiatives prove that progress is possible when device distribution is paired with infrastructure and training.
Preserving the future
The Galilee Foundation raised around £106,000 in a campaign to fund laptops and tablets for Gaza. However, with electronics barred from entering the Strip, the charity is pivoting toward high-impact, locally informed strategies.
“We’re now assessing where our support can be most effective within this ecosystem,” says Alfarra. “We’re comparing three interventions: device handouts, shared access hubs, and digital classroom platforms. Early evidence suggests that shared hubs combined with digital platforms offer the greatest impact under current constraints.”
To truly unlock online access, Alfarra asserts that stakeholders must coordinate hardware grants alongside low-cost rental models. This framework should offer communities flexible ways to secure refurbished computers from the secondary market, such as borrow-and-return schemes or installment plans.
Citing mechanisms outlined by Al-Azhar University, she argues that organizers must keep distribution targeted, prioritizing financially disadvantaged students and professionals whose specialized fields - such as engineering or software development - simply cannot be managed on mobile devices.
Meanwhile, international clients and academic institutions must adapt to the constraints facing these professionals, adds Elswerki. This requires optimizing platforms to be low-bandwidth and mobile-first, ensuring essential web tools run smoothly on basic mobile browsers.
Ultimately, overcoming the technological blockade is less a logistical challenge than a humanitarian imperative to preserve an entire generation’s future.
“Rebuilding Gaza's digital economy goes beyond replacing damaged devices,” notes Abu Hassira.
“It’s about protecting decades of human capital and empowering skilled individuals to reconnect with education, employment, entrepreneurship, and global markets. Investing in digital access today is an investment in Gaza's most valuable asset - its people.”
When Islamic finance assets of $5.99 trillion are included, the total market stands at nearly $9 trillion, making it one of the most significant and fastest-growing economic systems in the world.
The SGIE report assesses how countries are positioned to capture opportunities within the Islamic economy relative to their economic scale via the GIEI (Global Islamic Economy Indicators) index. The index comprises 52 metrics organised across five core components spanning the aforementionedseven sectors of the Islamic economy.
Scores are normalised to ensure comparability across economies of different sizes, meaning the ranking reflects ecosystem quality and coordination rather than absolute market volume.
Below are the 10 strongest Islamic economy ecosystems in the world, ranked by their 2025 GIEI scores.
INDICATOR SCORES BREAKDOWN FOR TOP 10 COUNTRIES
1. Malaysia
GIEI Score: 186.1
Malaysia retains its number one position for the twelfth consecutive year, ranking first in halal food, Islamic finance, and halal pharmaceuticals and cosmetics.
The country's ecosystem is anchored by the depth and global integration of its halal infrastructure: a fully digital certification system (MYeHALAL), expanded auditor capacity, and formal adoption of OIC/SMIIC halal standards for global alignment. In Islamic finance,
Malaysia recorded a 12% increase in assets and a 13% rise in Islamic fund value, with PNB's $300 million sukuk issuance among the headline transactions.
2. United Arab Emirates
GIEI Score: 137.5
The UAE climbs from the fourth to second slot, ranking in the top three across all six sectors. The country recorded the most active Islamic economy investment environment globally in 2025, with 94 transactions spanning venture capital, private equity, and M&A, and registered the second-highest FDI inflows among OIC countries at $45.6 billion.
Islamic finance expanded through a government Treasury Sukuk programme accessible from 4,000 Emirati dirhams, while digital innovation advanced through Shariah-compliant Bitcoin trading.
3. Saudi Arabia
GIEI Score: 107.9
Saudi Arabia ranks third overall, with particular strength in Islamic finance, halal food, and Muslim-friendly travel. Islamic finance assets grew 18%, outstanding sukuk rose 27%, and Islamic fund value increased 46%.
Tourism infrastructure is scaling rapidly, with Riyadh Air's inaugural international flights and $773 million in new tourism development fund projects signalling the kingdom's ambitions as a global halal travel destination.
4. Indonesia
GIEI Score: 96.0
Indonesia ranks fourth overall and first in modest fashion, with top-three positions in halal food, media and recreation. A landmark development this year was the elevation of the Halal Product Assurance Organizing Agency to cabinet level, giving it a direct mandate over halal certification, accreditation, and export facilitation.
Indonesia has also expanded its halal connectivity through 92 mutual recognition agreements across 24 countries and stands as the third-largest FDI recipient among OIC countries at $24.2 billion.
With Indonesia also being the world's largest Muslim-majority country, its domestic halal food market alone stood at $165.4 billion in 2024.
5. Bahrain
GIEI Score: 76.0
Bahrain holds its fifth-place position, ranking first in Muslim-friendly travel and fifth in Islamic finance. A small economy by OIC standards, Bahrain punches above its weight through regulatory excellence: the kingdom has been ranked first globally for Islamic finance regulatory frameworks, and its central bank's new Shariah-compliant stablecoin framework signals continued leadership in financial innovation.
Tourism is an expanding second pillar, with inbound visitors reaching nearly 15 million in 2024 — a near-20% year-on-year increase.
6. Türkiye
GIEI Score: 69.1
Türkiye ranks sixth, with its strongest performances in Muslim-friendly travel and halal food. The country is the third-largest modest fashion consumer market globally at $54.3 billion and the top halal pharmaceuticals consumer market among OIC countries at $11.2 billion.
Domestically, Türkiye's participation finance sector continues to deepen, with Istanbul increasingly positioned as a regional hub. On the investment side, Trendyol Go attracted a $700 million deal, the largest e-commerce transaction in the Islamic economy in 2025.
7. Pakistan
GIEI Score: 64.7
Pakistan enters the top 10 for the first time in the halal food GIEI sub-ranking and ranks seventh overall, reflecting rapid ecosystem maturation.
The country is home to the world's second-largest Muslim population and a fast-expanding Islamic banking sector that now represents a significant share of total banking assets.
Pakistan's media and recreation sector is also a notable strength, driven by the country's large and digitally engaged Muslim consumer base.
8. Iran
GIEI Score: 63.5
Iran returns to the top 10, driven primarily by the scale of its Islamic finance sector — the largest by asset volume globally at $2.24 trillion — and its modest fashion consumer market, where spending of $59.2 billion places it first in the world.
9. Kuwait
GIEI Score: 55.8
Kuwait's banking sector is among the most Islamically penetrated in the GCC, with Islamic banks holding a substantial share of total sector assets.
Kuwait's Muslim-friendly travel sector is also a source of strength, supported by significant outbound spending — $14.7 billion in 2024 — making it the fifth-largest Muslim travel consumer market globally.
Investment activity is concentrated in Islamic finance platforms and consumer-facing digital ventures.
10. Jordan
GIEI Score: 52.0
Jordan benefits from a mature Islamic banking sector, active sukuk activity, and a well-regarded regulatory environment.
Jordan is also an active halal pharmaceuticals exporter within the OIC bloc, ranking 15th globally for intra-OIC pharmaceutical exports.
Its position in the top 10 reflects consistent, broad-based performance across the GIEI's sub-indicators rather than dominance in any single sector.
Qatar has focused on reviving and developing Syria’s utility and aviation landscape. Last year, Syria signed a $7 billion deal with Qatar's UCC Holding-led consortium to add 5,000 megawatts to the national grid. The United Nations Development Programme estimates that Syria’s energy production has fallen by more than 80% from pre-war levels and that more than 70% of plants and transmission lines are damaged. Syria also inked a $4 billion deal with a consortium of companies led by UCC Holding to redevelop Damascus International Airport.
The UAE is also viewing Syria strategically to strengthen trade networks beyond the Strait of Hormuz and secure a greater regional role. Mohamed Alabbar, the co-founder of e-commerce platform Noon, is planning to invest up to $18 billion in Syria in addition to launching an e-commerce platform, he announced in May.
Local port authorities are increasing their investment and operational footprint to support enhanced trade flows and long-term economic growth. Dubai’s DP World signed an $800-million preliminary agreement to develop the port of Tartous, while Abu Dhabi's AD Ports Group purchased a $22 million stake in a container terminal in Syria's main commercial port, responsible for 95% of the country’s container volumes.
From January 2025 through February 2026, the GCC used a calibrated program of financial and political support that helped stabilize the Levant, writes Middle Eastern expert Norman Roule.
“Saudi Arabia actively shaped the political and economic architecture of Syria’s reintegration into the Arab world; the UAE’s investment will enhance the Levant’s future as a strategic shipping center; Qatar combined solvency support with energy-centric statecraft.”
However, despite all the money pouring in, the country’s reconstruction costs are disproportionately high, tenfold the size of its 2024 nominal GDP, according to World Bank’s last October estimates.
Moreso, the country will need $215 billion to reconstruct what thirteen years of conflict have destroyed, including $75 billion for residential buildings, $59 billion for non-residential structures, and $82 billion for infrastructure, according to the World Bank's Syria Physical Damage and Reconstruction Assessment 2011-2024 report.
Best estimate for reconstruction costs by governorate as of December 31, 2024 (US$m) Source: Syria Physical Damage and Reconstruction Assessment 2011-2024 report
Real GDP declined nearly 53% between 2010 and 2022 while nominal GDP contracted from $67.5 billion in 2011 to an estimated $21.4 billion in 2024.
“The estimates of reconstruction costs are about 10 times nominal 2024 GDP, reflecting both the extensive damage caused by the conflict as well as the years of massive economic contraction. The disruptions due to the conflict and to economic sanctions have also led to a reliance on imports, depletion of foreign reserves, and heavily constrained fiscal resources,” the World Bank report read.
Furthermore, despite the surge in investment interest, regional and international investors agree that the investment and regulatory regime need to be improved, Beth Morrissey, managing partner at Kleiman International Consultants, Inc., tells Salaam Gateway.
“At the moment, investors note lack of transparency and predictability, and Syria's neighbours are well-placed to help the country. We understand the existing legal/regulatory environment, judicial system and current investment laws were key discussions at the May UAE-Syrian business forum. Already, Saudi is assisting with a foreign investment protection framework and has indicated investment will begin to flow. Gulf investors have noted that decision-making is still centralized at the top of the government due to lack of existing institutions.”
“There is also some concern about last June's Investment Law 114, which amended but did not replace an earlier law, as it grants permanent concessions to investors, preserves the centralized system and could, in the future, imperil Syria's finances as, for example, export-oriented industries receive income tax reductions of up to 80 percent.”
I. Introduction
The alarming rise in global public debt demands innovative, long-term financing solutions. For the Global South, the “Looming Debt Crisis” highlights the need for transformative approaches beyond temporary relief. Among these, GDP-linked bonds are emerging as a promising pathway for sustainable development financing.
First proposed in the 1980s and gaining renewed support after successive debt crises, GDP-linked debt aligns repayment with economic performance. Supported by leading economists and the IMF, this model offers a sustainable way to manage debt and promote sustainable growth.
Islamic finance principles, rooted in risk-sharing, make GDP-linked Sukuk a natural fit for development finance. By tying obligations to GDP, these Sukuk provide equitable and resilient solutions that align with Islamic ethics.
This article explores the potential value of this model and the role of blockchain technology in supporting implementation. Blockchain ensures secure and transparent tracking of economic data, while smart contracts enhance the efficiency of execution.
II. Structure
The coupon and principal in GDP-linked bonds rise and fall in proportion to the issuing country’s nominal GDP. Robert Shiller has called these instruments “GDP shares” as they allow governments to raise funds while linking repayments to the resources of the economy. In this model, sovereign obligations adjust in line with economic performance.
Shiller has argued that replacing part of conventional national debt with claims linked to economic output could help governments better manage financial obligations, reduce the risk of future crises, and potentially lower borrowing costs over time.
Interest in the indexing of debt servicing to GDP first emerged in the 1980s and received fresh support after frequent debt crises. The idea was supported by several distinguished economists, including Joseph Stiglitz and has also received favorable consideration from the IMF.
III. Features
In their Foreword to the book Sovereign GDP-Linked Bonds: Rationale and Design (2018), Andy Haldane of the Bank of England and Maurice Obstfeld of the IMF, note the following appealing features of GDP-linked bonds:
They can provide the issuing government with debt relief when growth weakens and tax receipts decline.
Investors gain a route out of being locked into low-interest rates through exposure to the real economy while the debt-stabilizing effects of issuance mean default risks become more remote.
They also allow risk to be shared across borders more efficiently, ultimately reducing the need for sovereign bailouts and limiting moral hazard.
The “automatic stabilizer” role of GDP-linked instruments reduces the need to resort to procyclical policies. When economic growth slows, GDP indexation can ease debt pressures, lower the probability of default, and help reduce financial distress and rising unemployment.
In periods of low GDP growth, the GDP-linked instruments can reduce debt-servicing costs and reduce the need for more borrowing or taxes. This would help to smooth the tax rate and reduce uncertainty for consumption and investment. Conversely, higher payments during stronger GDP growth may discourage governmental overspending. As a result, sovereigns may gain greater short-term budget flexibility while maintaining long-term solvency and resilience to financial turmoil.
A key element for the success of GDP-linked bonds, Griffith-Jones remarks is to identify the proper set of investors interested in this kind of bond. Given their equity-like features, they may appeal to equity investors as well as those interested in hybrid instruments. Moreover, since GDP-linked bonds are directly linked to the overall economy, they have elements of Development Impact Bonds.
Arshadur Rahman of the Bank of England suggests issuing GDP-linked Sukuk. To the extent that GDP is correlated with government income, then the GDP-linked Sukuk will represent a form of partnership between the government and investors. From a Shari’ah perspective, this structure potentially emulates musharakah arrangements.
IV. Blockchain networks
A serious challenge for GDP-linked instruments is the reliability of the data on which investors’ returns depend. Conventional economic statistics rely on samples intended to represent the entire economy, but these may create inaccuracies requiring revision in subsequent releases. In addition, given the centralized nature of the process, data are exposed to the risks of manipulation and interference. These challenges limit the appeal of GDP-linked instruments to investors.
Issuing GDP-linked papers requires establishing an effective system for collecting verifiable and consistent data. Blockchain technology can be very helpful in this regard. This can be done as follows:
1. A group of blockchain networks of consumers, producers, wholesalers, and retailers, among others, can be established with the verifiable identities of each member of each network. Each network would be dedicated to a particular sector of the economy.
2. Data from sector-specific networks can be aggregated into a national blockchain network, providing a comprehensive and real-time estimate of GDP.
3. This unified approach ensures consistency and avoids duplication or gaps in data collection.
4. Members of each network could report:
a. Current price of a pre-identified set of goods and services within their respective sectors.
b. Expected prices over defined future periods.
5. Reported data are verified by members following blockchain verification and consensus algorithms. The IsDB Institute developed the patented “Proof of Use” algorithm as a more economically sustainable alternative to Proof of Work.
6. Members could be rewarded tokens issued by the networks’ sponsors such as the central banks or relevant authorities.
This process would help ensure that the collected data are transparent, observable, easy to compute, and non-manipulative. Since the technology requires only an internet connection and smartphones, the data collection process requires minimal upfront costs.
The Blockchain network can be used to collect various kinds of data including indicators related to financial inclusion and broader development outcomes.
Digital GDP-linked Sukuk could be issued and distributed through the Blockchain network. These Digital Sukuks would represent a tokenized form of the Sukuk certificates and their underlying contractual terms.
Smart contracts can be used to link the periodic Sukuk payments with the data collection network. Using blockchain on both sides, data collection and Sukuk issuance are likely to make the entire process seamless, transparent, and efficient. This allows the Sukuk to be accessible to a wider range of investors, particularly retail investors.
V. Issues and challenges
While the Digital GDP-linked Sukuk might be conceptually appealing, there are many issues that need to be addressed before implementation. For example:
Managing the blockchain networks would be demanding and may involve some centralized control. Although the risks of manipulation are much lower than the centralized approach, some risks remain.
Developing countries, which stand to benefit most from GDP-linked Sukuk, may face challenges in implementing and maintaining blockchain networks due to limited infrastructure and technical expertise.
Ensuring that all economic actors, including those in remote or underserved areas, can participate in the blockchain network will require extensive outreach and capacity building.
GDP-linked Sukuk are suitable for most middle-income countries with promising growth prospects.
Very-low-income countries could issue sector-specific Sukuk tied to growth in sectors such as agriculture, mining, or oil & gas.
Although the GDP-linked Sukuk of a single country may carry higher risk, a diversified portfolio of such instruments could reduce risks.
VI. Conclusion
Islamic finance is, at its core, a risk-sharing system with the capacity to absorb and manage various economic risks. This will not make the economy risk-free, but it will make these risks manageable and self-stabilizing. However, when debt becomes excessive, these risks can become destabilising.
GDP-linked Sukuk offers an innovative approach to sustainable financing by aligning debt obligations with a country's economic performance. This instrument can help curb excessive debt accumulation while promoting a more stable and inclusive growth, reflecting the risk-sharing principles of Islamic finance.
Author: Dr. Sami Al Suwailem Acting Director General, IsDBI
This article is produced and sponsored by IsDBI. It was first published in the State of the Global Islamic Economy 2025/26 report produced by DinarStandard. The report can be downloaded from here.
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